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Friends, Foes, Flatmates: On the Relationship between Law and Bioethics 
 
Richard Huxtable 
 
1. A Tale of Two Flatmates 
 
Lei-Kung, from China, shares an apartment with his younger flatmate Bronislawa, who is 
Polish. Each has their own room, into which their flatmate can venture. They drafted the 
rules of the flat together, dividing responsibility for shared areas, like the kitchen. Lei-
Kung is primarily responsible for the rota and basic maintenance, while Bronislawa 
regularly cleans. The apartment occupies an urban complex, whose residents toil 
together on common areas, such as the stairwells; Lei-Kung and Bronislawa typically 
work alongside their neighbours Sachan, Theo, Pascal, and Hakym and his family. 
Communication is complicated by the many languages they speak, and disagreements 
do arise. Bronislawa nevertheless throws frequent parties for the block. Once close to 
Theo, Bronislawa’s best friend nowadays is Pascal, who tries to get on with everyone, 
although his relationship with Sachan is sometimes strained.  
Occasionally the relationship between Lei-Kung and Bronislawa is also tested. Lei-Kung 
likes to keep busy doing things; Bronislawa does too, although she is also something of a 
dreamer. Lei-Kung sometimes exclaims that Bronislawa is “摽 (biào)” – a word not easily 
translated for Bronislawa, but which essentially means that she restricts his movement 
by hanging off his arm while he walks. Bronislawa, meanwhile, judges Lei-Kung to be 
“kombinować” – also difficult to translate, this suggests that Bronislawa dislikes Lei-
Kung’s contrived solutions to problems arising in the flat.  
Each does, however, speak some of the other’s language, and Lei-Kung and Bronislawa 
usually get along amicably, appreciating their flatmate’s contributions to communal life. 
Perhaps their relationship will develop: from flatmates, who are occasionally foes but 
often friends, to, one day, spouses.  
This tale of two flatmates may seem an unlikely starting place, but metaphors abound in 
the literature that explores the relationship between bioethics and law: they “share much 
of the same turf”;1 they may be related by blood, either as “close but estranged cousins”,2 
or as twin siblings;3 perhaps they are related by marriage;4 or, maybe, as Miola suggests, 
they are “flatmates rather than bedfellows”.5 In our tale, Bronislawa, whose name means 
Divine Protector, represents bioethics, while Lei-Kung, which means God of Retribution, 
represents law. These are our protagonists, but we will also encounter Sachan (sociable), 
who represents the social sciences, Theo (godly), who personifies theology, Pascal, who 
                                                          
1 M.C. Sullivan and D.F. Reynolds, ‘Where law and bioethics meet ... and where they 
don’t!!’, University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, 75 (1998), 607-620, 620.  
2 C. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics 
and Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009), p. xi.  
3 W. van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics: The twin disciplines’, Erasmus Working Paper Series 
on Jurisprudence and Socio-Legal Studies No. 10-02 (2010). Available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract (no. = 1631720)>, 2.  
4 S.M. Wolf, ‘Law & bioethics: From values to violence’, Journal of Law, Medicine & 
Ethics, 32 (2004), 293-306, 293.  
5 J. Miola, ‘The interaction of medical law and medical ethics’, Clinical Ethics, 1(1) 
(2006), 22-25, 25.  
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stands for philosophy, and Hakym (doctor) and his family (i.e. the various health sciences 
and allied professions).  
My aim here is to contemplate the relationship between bioethics and law and, in 
particular, to consider what law can – and cannot – contribute to bioethics. This will involve 
some empirical reflection, although conceptual and normative questions will also feature, 
including how we should understand each domain and thus how we should view the 
relationship. I suggest that law’s (positive) contributions can be captured by five P’s, which 
relate to law’s purpose, processes, products, practices and phrasing. Despite these areas 
of contribution and convergence, there is also divergence and distraction, summarised in 
five A’s, which concern articulation, angst, action, aspiration and audience. Of course, in 
order to see both the good and the ill in the relationship between law and bioethics, we 
need first to define each of these domains.  
 
2. Bioethics as a Discipline of Disciplines 
 
To locate “bioethics”, let us remove the “bio” prefix and first consider “ethics”, or moral 
philosophy.6 This discipline encompasses four (somewhat overlapping) sub-disciplines: 
normative ethics, which constructs and criticises normative theories of what we should 
do or who we should be; applied ethics, which relates such theories to specific fields; 
meta-ethics, which reflects on the concepts at stake; and descriptive ethics, which 
analyses actual moral beliefs and practices.7  
Unsurprisingly, bioethics, which developed from medical ethics in the 1960s,8 
accommodates all of this work, albeit with a focus on the biosciences.9 Reich defines 
bioethics as “the systematic study of the moral dimensions – including moral vision, 
decisions, conduct, and policies – of the life sciences and health care, employing a 
variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting”.10 As the final clause 
suggests, bioethics – like the party-hosting Bronislawa – provides a meeting place. 
Indeed, bioethics is distinctively inter-, multi- or even trans-disciplinary, inviting in a 
variety of disciplines (amongst them philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychology and 
                                                          
6 I will use ethics and morals interchangeably.  
7 van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 5; cf. A. Dawson and S. Wilkinson, ‘Philosophical clinical 
ethics’, Clinical Ethics, 4 (2009), 36–37, 36; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical Care 
Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine: Ethical Issues (London: Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2006), para. 2.2.  
8 Histories of medical ethics include: A.R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (Oxford 
University Press, 1998); M. Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics: Constructing the inter-
Discipline’, in M. Freeman (ed), Law and Bioethics: Current Legal Issues 2008, Volume 
11 (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-11. The precise origins of bioethics are, 
however, contested:  M.A. Rothstein, ‘The role of law in the development of American 
bioethics’, J Int Bioethique, 20(4) (2009), 73-111.  
9 See T.J. Silber, ‘Bioethics: An interdisciplinary enterprise’, Journal of Religion and 
Health, 21(1) (1982), 21-28, 21. He sees bioethics as a special case of universal ethics, 
rather than a special professional ethics, a point deliberately reflected in the naming of 
the Centre for Ethics in Medicine, in which I work: G.M. Stirrat, personal communication.  
10 W.T. Reich, Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Vol. I (New York: Macmillan, 1995), xxi.  
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theology11), each of which has its own language but which must – at least in bioethics’ 
gatherings – communicate with its neighbours.12  
Although its contributing disciplines (like medicine) are also heterogeneous,13 bioethics 
appears a particularly broad church. So is bioethics itself a discipline? Foucault 
suggested that “The disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a 
scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, 
disqualify and invalidate”.14 One of bioethics’ pioneers, Dan Callahan, noted in 1973 that 
disciplines involve the acquisition of professional expertise, through specific training and 
apprenticeships, in which particular methodologies, approaches and commitments are 
learnt.15 But, he added, disciplines can also exhibit arrogance, insulation, neurosis and 
narrow(minded)ness. Four decades on, some say that bioethics still lacks the necessary 
unity to be a discipline.16 Yet, bioethics does have many of the features - good and bad – 
to which Foucault and Callahan referred, including education programmes, learned 
journals, and professional appointments and organisations.17 Despite all this, it is 
intriguing (or is it telling?) that many of bioethics’ practitioners decline to label 
themselves “bioethicists”.18  
Discipline or not, we might nevertheless ponder what is distinctive about this bioethics 
beast. Here we re-encounter Bronislawa, and specifically her ties to Theo and Pascal. 
While once bioethics seemed particularly associated with theology,19 nowadays it is 
philosophy which asserts its dominance. According to Brownsword, “as a critical 
discipline, bioethics tries to sort out the moral wheat from the non-moral chaff”.20 In 
short, bioethics is ethics, which is moral philosophy, albeit visiting the realm of the 
biosciences.  
Recalling Callahan’s concerns, some of the other contributing disciplines – notably the 
social sciences – have been critical of bioethics’ apparent emphasis on normative, 
applied and meta-ethics, at the expense of descriptive ethics.21 As this volume attests, 
the tide is turning, and perhaps necessarily so, since bioethics must engage with the real 
                                                          
11 Although explicitly selective, Silber’s list (notably?) omits law: Silber, ‘Bioethics’, 24-25.  
12 D. Callahan, ‘Bioethics as a discipline’, The Hastings Center Studies, 1(1) (1973), 66-
73, 70-71; Silber, ‘Bioethics’, 27.  
13 Silber, ‘Bioethics’, 24. 
14 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage, 1977), p. 223.  
15 Callahan, ‘Bioethics as a discipline’, 66.  
16 N. Priaulx, ‘The troubled identity of the bioethicist’, Health Care Analysis, 21(1) (2013), 
6-19.  
17 Notably, Brownsword describes bioethics as a discipline: R. Brownsword, ‘Bioethics: 
Bridging from morality to law?’ in M. Freeman (ed), Law and Bioethics: Current Legal 
Issues 2008, Volume 11 (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 12-30, 15. 
18 Bioethics’ inter-disciplinarity can cause problems e.g. in the UK Research Excellence 
Framework, which assesses the quality of academic work, on which basis Universities 
are awarded funding. Lacking their own panel, “bioethicists” return to their original 
disciplinary homes, hopeful that their work is not too tainted by inter-discplinarity.  
19 E.g. Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics’, 10.  
20 Brownsword, ‘Bioethics’, 15.  
21 E.g. A,M. Hedgecoe, ‘Critical bioethics: Beyond the social science critique of applied 
ethics’, Bioethics 18(2) (2004), 120-143.  
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world.22 Moral philosophy helps identify “the elements of a moral position” but, 
Brownsword continues,  
“bioethics is much more proximately concerned with developing working guidance 
for those who wish to do the right thing but who are unclear what they should 
actually do in particular cases – such, for example, seems to be the inspiration for 
much of the interest in clinical ethics committees”.23 
Bioethics, then, has not only a theoretical but also a practical remit.24 Miola indicates 
that bioethics does its diverse work in three sectors.25 At the formal level there are 
authoritative, directive professional bodies, such as the UK General Medical Council 
(GMC), which regulates doctors. The semi-formal sector is less authoritative but 
nonetheless influential, comprising organisations like the UK’s Royal Colleges and the 
British Medical Association (BMA). Here we might also include clinical ethics committees 
and national bioethics committees (like those in the USA, Belgium and Singapore). 
Miola’s unofficial sector, meanwhile, comprises the discourses flowing from the 
academy, as well as from pressure groups. Miola feels that the lower levels of the 
hierarchy should influence the upper tiers, although we might wonder why and, indeed, 
whether the lowest tier should be further differentiated.26 It might also be notable that 
Miola, a legal academic, posits an organisation like the GMC – which has the force of law 
– at the pinnacle. How, then, might its decrees differ from those issued by law? Indeed, 
where and how does law fit into this whole picture?  
Like bioethics, law is notoriously difficult to define.27 Lon Fuller, however, helpfully 
defines the concept of law as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules”.28 This is useful because it appears not to beg any questions about 
the (conceptual) relationship between law and ethics. Jurists have, of course, long 
queried whether law is, in principle, a moral enterprise. The legal idealists (or natural 
lawyers), with whom Fuller sided, perceive a necessary connection between law and 
ethics; legal positivists, exemplified by Hart, take the opposite view.29  
Alongside the conceptual relationship between law and ethics, there is also the empirical 
relationship to consider, and thus those made (or positive) laws issued in particular 
jurisdictions. Is law, in practice, a moral enterprise? Some legal officials think so: “It 
would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every 
                                                          
22 Cf. G.M. Stirrat, ‘How to approach ethical issues: A guide’, The Obstetrician & 
Gynaecologist, 5 (2003), 214-217, 214.  
23 Brownsword, ‘Bioethics’, 16-17.  
24 Cf. Sullivan and Reynolds, ‘Law and bioethics’, 609.  
25 Miola, ‘The interaction’, 23. Although he considers medical ethics, his point seems 
equally applicable to (the wider) bioethics.  
26 Although each possesses a useful moral compass, pressure groups and academic 
scholars seem distinct. Presumably, for example, scholarship involves a particular 
expertise, although some resist the idea: see R. Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise 
at the Limits of Life: To Treat or Not to Treat? (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 172-176.  
27 Sullivan and Reynolds, ‘Law and bioethics’, 607.  
28 L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 
p. 96.  
29 E.g. H.L.A. Hart, ‘Review: Fuller, The Morality of Law’, Harvard Law Review, 78 (1965), 
1281-1296.  
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legal duty is founded on a moral obligation”.30 Yet, given our specific interest in law’s 
relationship with bioethics, we should ask: is law, in bio-practice, a moral enterprise?  
Some would suggest that the (made) laws governing bio-practices are indeed indebted to 
bioethics.31 “Bioethics helped to conceptualize problems, elucidate essential values, and 
influence the development of legal doctrines and processes”, suggests Rothstein.32 As 
such, meta-ethical bioethics can clarify common legal concepts, like the “reasonable 
man (sic)”, “intention” and “public morals”.33 Bioethically relevant data might also be 
adduced,34 while bioethics’ normative and applied work can provide prescriptions about, 
say, respect for autonomy,35 and the value of human life.36  
These different contributions will appear in different legal locations. Common law 
systems, for example, refer to written rules and to judges’ rulings. So, in English law, not 
only will we hear bioethics’ voice(s) in the commissions and reports that precede Acts of 
Parliament,37 but we will also encounter judicial references to the bioethical work 
occurring in the formal,38 semi-formal,39 and unofficial sectors of the discipline.40 In 
other common law systems, like the US, “bioethicists” have even acted as expert 
witnesses in court proceedings.41 Such jurisdictions differ from civil law systems, in 
which the general principles enshrined in a written code provide the primary source of 
law. Even in these systems, the rules can tackle bioethical matters: for example, in 2005, 
French law clarified the rules governing end-of-life care.42  
As such, bioethics may be a discipline but it evidently encompasses a variety of 
endeavours, ranging from theorising in the abstract to collecting empirical data. In all of 
                                                          
30 Instan (1893) 1 QB 450, 453, per Coleridge LCJ.  
31 Particularly, perhaps, in medicine: Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics’, 5. Indeed, the 
dilemmas that birthed bioethics also spurred the development of medical (or health care) 
law: see e.g. Rothstein, ‘Role of law’, 1-3. These similar trajectories and themes (e.g. 
medical lawyers, like “bioethicists”, are occasionally asked what sort of lawyer they really 
are) merit further investigation.  
32 Rothstein, ‘Role of law’, 3; see also Callahan, ‘Bioethics as a discipline’, 68. 
33 van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 2, 9, 23.  
34 E.g. Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1, para. 27.  
35 Although maybe law got there first: see G.J. Annas, ‘Ethics committees: From ethical 
comfort to ethical cover’, Hastings Center Report, 21 (1991), 18-21.  
36 E.g. “The Philosophers’ Brief”, supporting the right to physician-assisted suicide, which 
was submitted by Dworkin and colleagues to the US Supreme Court in Vacco v Quill, 521 
US 793 (1997).  
37 E.g. The Retained Organ Commission (vice-chaired by Alastair V. Campbell) and the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics contributed to the passing of the Human Tissue Act 2004, 
while Mary Warnock’s commission led to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990. For a US perspective, see Rothstein, ‘Role of law’, 4.  
38 E.g. GMC guidance on confidentiality was cited in W v Egdell [1990] 2 WLR 471.  
39 E.g. Guidance from the BMA and a Royal College were respectively cited in Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 and An NHS Trust v H [2013] 1 FLR 1471.   
40 E.g. Ronald Dworkin’s (bioethical and biolegal) work is cited in Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 and Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41.  
41 Sullivan and Reynolds, ‘Law and bioethics’, 619. 
42 Law no. 2005-370.  
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its endeavours, however, bioethics’ seeks to engage with practice i.e. it seeks to work 
with, and speak to, the “real world”. Law also performs a variety of tasks, but it too is 
concerned with actual practice: it seeks to issue rules which guide people in this real 
world. This common orientation begins to suggest that the two are related. On some 
accounts, (bio)ethics and law share a conceptual relationship, but even those who 
dispute this relationship would accept that bioethics can and does contribute to law in 
practice. But does bioethics itself gain or lose from its relationship with law? Let us start 
with the apparent positive contributions.  
 
3. Contribution and Convergence 
 
Law’s first constructive contribution to bioethics resides in its fundamental purpose: to 
guide human behaviour. Law, as the older partner (or flatmate), might have much to 
teach bioethics here, and bioethics should be receptive, as it too strives not merely to 
theorise about, but also to influence human activity. As Van der Burg says: “Both law and 
morality are hermeneutic, normative, and argumentative systems or practices, their 
purpose being to guide human action... Moreover, both are social in character: they 
purport to regulate behaviour in order to make our society and our lives better”.43 Lei-
Kung and Bronislawa worked together to ensure successful communal living. On Van der 
Burg’s account, the purported differences between law and bioethics should not be 
inflated. Different jurists have emphasised different features of the legal enterprise, 
including its assumed sovereignty and its capacity to impose sanctions.44 Yet, some 
sectors of bioethics – not least Miola’s formal sector – need not be so different: the non-
compliant doctor, for example, might be struck from the medical register. In its normative 
guise, meanwhile, bioethics might be deemed distinctive for its issuance of authoritative 
prescriptions, which are to be considered universalisable and for the good of all.45 But 
law similarly seeks to be authoritative, prescriptive, general in its application (at least 
within jurisdictional boundaries, unless explicit exceptions are carved out), and a force 
for ensuring the good of society at large.46 In short, as each pursues the goal of guiding 
human co-existence, law and bioethics might not be so distinct.  
Insofar as they share a goal, bioethics and law can also appeal to similar standards for 
judging the success or failure of the endeavour. Here law makes a second helpful 
contribution, as law is characteristically concerned with process (Lei-Kung, you will recall, 
took charge of devising the rota). As such, the standards of assessment – or the 
methodologies employed – in each discipline might share similarities and, again, as the 
senior partner, law might have a great deal of experience on which bioethics can fruitfully 
draw.  
Jurists have long pondered what it is that makes (made) law law, or, put differently, what 
makes for good law, if not (necessarily) in a moral sense, then in the sense of achieving 
                                                          
43 van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 18; see also A.R. Maclean, ‘Magic, myths, and fairy 
tales: Consent and the relationship between law and ethics’, in M. Freeman (ed), Law 
and Bioethics: Current Legal Issues 2008, Volume 11 (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
pp. 111-135, p. 111.  
44 See e.g. J.G. Riddall, Jurisprudence, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 1999). See also 
van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 18.  
45 T.L. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1991).  
46 van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 19 
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law’s goal. Fuller was joined in this quest by theorists interested in the “rule of law” and 
“legal rationality”.47 Fuller’s “internal morality of law” accordingly included such norms as 
clarity, consistency and coherence between the law-as-stated and the law-as-applied, 
without which law could not hope to guide its subjects.48 Similar questions arise about 
what we might call the “internal morality of bioethics”. Those interested in the standards 
associated with (good) bioethics – a bioethics that achieves its goal – have identified 
markedly similar norms, again including consistency, clarity and coherence.49  
Certainly, in both disciplines, critical questions are asked about the ultimate ends of the 
particular endeavour. Some jurists have insisted that law entails a particular set of moral 
commitments, 50 while some bioethicists urge adherence to a given normative theory.51 
But many of the aforementioned norms (clarity, consistency and the like) are merely 
formal, instrumental or procedural – and it is here that law seems particularly well-
equipped to educate bioethics. Law is experienced in issuing judgments on particular 
situations, by reference to guiding principles and to the situation itself. Law tackles the 
case and the doctrine, the latter becoming the principle in bioethics’ language. In both 
disciplines bottom-up and top-down approaches feature. There are, of course, 
differences within each discipline: a civil law system might favour a top-down (doctrine-
led) approach, rather than the more mixed approach we might encounter in a common 
law system; in bioethics, meanwhile, casuists might work from the bottom-up, while 
those beholden to particular principles might prefer to work down to the case in 
question. But, whichever extreme is preferred (and there will be middle-ground 
positions52), law will have important insights to offer.  
To illustrate these observations, consider the common ground between common lawyers 
and bioethical casuists: each takes an approach that is “inductive and particularist, and, 
it would appear to be, dismissive of principles”.53 Yet, this is not the whole story, as 
Annas, commenting on the US, hints when he says that “law’s primary contribution to 
bioethics is procedural. Lawyers are expert at procedure. The common law itself is based 
on deciding individual cases and using these cases as the basis of creating law. 
Bioethics has adopted this technique”.54 Annas here appears to be describing the way in 
which particular rulings “create law” by generating rules and, indeed, wider legal 
                                                          
47 See further Huxtable, Law, Ethics, pp. 14-22.  
48 Fuller, Morality.  
49 E.g. T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004); Dawson and Wilkinson, ‘Philosophical ethics’. There are related inquiries 
into the “internal morality of medicine”: R.M. Veatch and F.G. Miller, eds, ‘The internal 
morality of medicine’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 26(6) (2001).  
50 R. Brownsword, ‘Towards a rational law of contract’ in T. Wilhelmsson (ed.), 
Perspectives of Critical Contract Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), 241-272.   
51 See J. Arras, ‘Theory and bioethics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013), 
E.N. Zalta, ed. Available at: 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/theory-bioethics/>; see also van 
der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 13ff.  
52 See further the discussion of reflective equilibrium, below.  
53 Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics’, 7.  
54 Annas, ‘Ethics committees’, quoted by Jonsen, Birth, 343.  
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doctrines.55 As such, the principle-generating bioethicist could also find helpful 
precedents in the story of the common law.  
Precedent is, of course, crucial in the common law. Yet, although the approach is 
potentially conservative in its adherence to decided cases (and thus the past),56 
changing times can mean changes in the law.57 Officials working in a common law 
system will therefore tack between the case arising and the overarching doctrine or 
principle. This two-way process appears increasingly popular in bioethics too, not least 
with those who adopt Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium”.58 The method involves working 
back-and-forth among our considered judgments about particular cases, the principles or 
rules that we believe govern them, and theoretical considerations, making adjustments 
along the way, with the aim of achieving coherence between them. Used by Rawls in his 
analysis of justice, bioethics’ embrace of reflective equilibrium is evident in, for example, 
its deployment in Beauchamp and Childress’ principlist approach.59 Furthermore, and of 
particular relevance here, reflective equilibrium has been promoted as a methodological 
approach to conducting empirical bioethics research, by which theory and data might be 
combined.60 As the common law has long used such a method, albeit not by name, here 
too we might expect law to make a valuable contribution to bioethics, not least to the 
aforementioned debates about methodology in bioethics. Indeed, the ideas might 
usefully transfer in both directions. Empirical research in law (such as socio-legal studies) 
is (like bioethics) backed by training programmes, journals and organisations, but 
remains relatively new and it lacks an agreed meaning or scope; perhaps, then, the 
insights offered in empirical bioethics research might in turn contribute to the evolution 
of empirical legal research.61  
Returning to law’s contribution to bioethics, and specifically to law’s proceduralist bent, 
we should note that procedure also features elsewhere in bioethics’ business, so there 
will be other ways in which law might fruitfully contribute. Those in the unofficial sector 
who advocate a proceduralist bioethics – promoting, for example, “accountability for 
                                                          
55 Of course, legal doctrines might also develop from other legal sources, such as Acts of 
Parliament: see e.g. van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 12.   
56 See e.g. Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics’, 7.  
57 E.g. “Social customs change, and the law ought to, and does in fact, have regard to 
such changes when they are of major importance”, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech 
Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 171, per Lord Fraser.  
58 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1972); see van der Burg, ‘Law 
and ethics’, 16.  
59 T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th edn. (Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  
60 E.g. M. De Vries and E. Van Leeuwen, ‘Reflective equilibrium and empirical data: Third 
person moral experiences in empirical medical ethics’, Bioethics, 24(9) (2010), 490-498. 
61 H. Genn, M. Partington and S. Wheeler, Law in the Real World: Improving our 
Understanding of How Law Works (Nuffield Foundation, 2006), para 16; D. Watkins and 
M. Burton, eds., Research Methods in Law (Oxon.: Routledge, 2013). I know of socio-
legal scholars who already incorporate the methodological insights offered by empirical 
bioethics, and such cross-fertilisation seems promising.  
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reasonableness”,62 or “principled compromise”63 – could benefit from law’s 
experiences,64 as might some of those working in bioethics’ semi-formal sector, such as 
on clinical ethics committees.65 In short, as a forum in which process is king, law might 
helpfully guide its younger cohabitee.  
But law can also contribute in substance, not merely in form. Put simply, law’s products 
provide work for every sector of bioethics, from the academy to the committee. Law’s 
edicts will often say something on which bioethics will also have an opinion (or, more 
likely, opinions plural). So, for example, many – maybe all – medico-legal rulings will 
include or invite ethical evaluation (no matter what some judges say).66 The unofficial, 
academic sector will accordingly take to the journals to reflect on legal developments at 
home and away, while occupants of the other sectors might have cause to revise the 
guidance they issue.67 This interplay between bioethics and law seems strikingly 
apparent when the end(ing) of life is in view.68 The US case of Karen Ann Quinlan,69 in 
the 1970s, appears a pivotal moment in the development of both disciplines.70 Here, for 
the first time, a court contemplated terminating the life-supporting treatment being 
provided to an incapacitated patient. Citing a proposal from an academic lawyer,71 the 
judges even explicitly created (semi-formal) work for bioethics, by advocating the creation 
of clinical ethics committees. Whether it is adjudicating on matters of life or death, law 
evidently provides many of the raw materials for constructing bioethics.72   
Yet, to change metaphors, law does more than serve up the morsels for moral 
mastication: law also checks that bioethics’ recipes are palatable. Law thus provides a 
testing ground for the practice of bioethics. Law is inherently empirical in orientation: its 
                                                          
62 N. Daniels and J.E. Sabin, ‘Limits to health care: Fair procedures, democratic 
deliberation and the legitimacy problem for insurers’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
26(4) (1997), 303-350.  
63 Huxtable, Law, Ethics.  
64 Although some argue that bioethics should not become too proceduralist and law-like: 
D. Sperling, ‘Law and bioethics: A rights-based relationship and its troubling implications’, 
in M. Freeman (ed), Law and Bioethics: Current Legal Issues 2008, Volume 11 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 52-78, p. 62.   
65 S. McLean, ‘Clinical ethics committees: A due process wasteland?’ Clinical Ethics, 3 
(2008), 99-104.  
66 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2000] 4 All ER 961, 969, per 
Ward LJ.  
67 E.g. the first instance decision (reversed on appeal) in R (on the application of Burke) v 
General Medical Council [2005] 2 WLR 431. 
68 Sullivan and Reynolds, ‘Law and bioethics’, 619; see also J. Coggon, ‘Assisted dying 
and the context of debate: “Medical law” versus “end-of-life law”’, Medical Law Review, 
18 (2010), 541-563.  
69 In re Quinlan (1976) NJ 355 A 2d 647.  
70 See R. Huxtable, Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise 
(London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), pp. 115ff. 
71 K. Teel, ‘The physician's dilemma: A doctor’s view: What the law should be’, Baylor Law 
Review, 27 (1975), 6-9. 
72 Indeed, in the case of clinical ethics committees, it arguably provided a building for 
bioethics to occupy.  
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edicts must have purchase in the real world. Many bioethical issues have indeed been 
tested in legal claims: “law is experienced with analysing and solving social problems”.73 
Law sometimes does bioethics and, in doing so, it is normatively open:74 it is “ready to 
take on ethics if that is what gets served up to it for the making of decisions”.75 Law can, 
therefore, test out bioethics’ concepts (for example, beneficence becomes “best 
interests” in the lawyer’s lexicon), as well as its (action-directed) normative theories, like 
deontology and rule-utilitarianism. Law is, after all, replete with rules and devoted to 
duties, so the bioethicist may see in law different ways in which a particular normative 
commitment could (not) or should (not) be worked through.  
Whether law gets things right (in some sense) should not detract from the fact that law 
has to put its morals where its mouth is: law cannot merely theorise, it must also 
decide.76 For some, this makes law the senior partner to bioethics.77 As McLean says, 
“irrespective of the ethical views of decision-makers – legal or medical – there are rules 
under which they must operate [which] are superior (in practical terms) to the outcome 
predicted by adherents to one ethical school of thought or another”.78 The law is (quite 
rightly) under unrelenting scrutiny for the ways in which it strives “day by day to solve the 
real problems of real people”.79 Bioethics might provide such scrutiny but, in its unofficial 
sector at least, it is rarely subjected to the same inspection.80 Law therefore has the 
benefit, and undoubted burden, of doing ethics work in the real world and, in doing so, it 
has surely learnt lessons that bioethics should heed. Law’s empirical orientation 
therefore warrants repetition. Law will sometimes appear to get things ethically “wrong”, 
according to some theory or other. But perhaps law can teach the ethical theorists 
something too, about the sorts of practical resolutions to which particular moral 
problems are most – or least – amenable.  
And, finally, law’s lessons need not be incomprehensible to bioethics: law’s phrasing can 
be heard. Lei-Kung and Bronislawa were able to communicate and so too are law and 
bioethics – indeed, they share a common language, of rules, principles, and rights.81 The 
commonality is perhaps unsurprising, given the prevalence of academic lawyers in the 
                                                          
73 Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics’, 6.  
74 van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 2.  
75 D. Callahan, ‘Escaping from legalism: Is it possible?’, Hastings Center Report, 26(6) 
(1996), 34-35, 34.  
76 See Rothstein, ‘Role of law’, 3; Sperling, ‘Law and bioethics’, 54.  
77 Cf. Foster, Choosing Life, p. xi. 
78 S.A.M. McLean, ‘Law, ethics and health care’, in R. Ashcroft, A. Dawson, H. Draper and 
J. McMillan (eds), Principles of Health Care Ethics, 2nd edn (Chichester: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2007), pp. 193-198, 196. 
79 P. Birks, ‘Rights, wrongs, and remedies’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 20(1) (2000), 
1-37, 2-3. 
80 Note, however, the furore sparked by A. Giubilini and F. Minerva, ‘After-birth abortion: 
why should the baby live?’ Journal of Medical Ethics, 39 (2013), 261-263.  
81 Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics’, 6; Sperling, ‘Law and bioethics’,  55; Miola, ‘The 
interaction’, 24.  
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unofficial sector of bioethics.82 Given all this, bioethics can – and arguably should – hear 
law’s voice.83  
 
4. Divergence and Distraction 
 
Whilst law therefore can and does offer much to bioethics, the news is not all good. Law 
also differs from bioethics in ways that mean each can distract, and detract from, the 
other. First, returning to the previous point, problems of articulation do arise. Law’s styles 
and conventions – at least within a strict legal arena – certainly differ from those 
adopted in bioethics’ sectors: lawyers address one another in formal, indirect and 
cautious (as opposed to clear) terms, and they will conventionally defer to authority.84 
Although bioethics invites a degree of deference,85 its practitioners seemingly prefer the 
pursuit of clarity and defensibility and, whilst their opinions remain revisable in principle, 
their exchanges can be very direct indeed.86  
Here too there are problems not only of style but also of substance. Lei-Kung and 
Bronislawa each faced the difficulty of translating particular words for their flatmate. In 
law and bioethics, we find that even common words have uncommon, technical 
meanings:87 for example, pluralistic legal accounts of respect for autonomy do not 
necessarily correspond with the equally pluralistic accounts writ in bioethics’ corpus.88 
Whenever a discipline re-frames an issue in its terms, it risks stripping the presenting 
problem of “the complex facticity with which it actually presented”.89 Law might be 
particularly susceptible to this reductionist charge: a complex, fractious issue like 
assisted dying is swept into a brute legal category and emerges unrecognisable to 
bioethics (and even the protagonists) as the original dilemma.90 The resulting problems 
of translation return us to law’s purpose: as Schneider puts it, “we should remember that 
the law’s calling is to regulate social life, however awkwardly, and its language reflects 
that purpose”.91 We saw earlier that bioethics can share this purpose, but Schneider 
                                                          
82 Rothstein, ‘Role of law’, 1-2; Sperling, ‘Law and bioethics’, 55.  
83 R. Huxtable and S. Ost, ‘Voices Carry? The Voice of Bioethics in the Courtroom and 
Voice of Law in Bioethics’, in R. Huxtable and R. ter Meulen, The Voices and Rooms of 
European Bioethics (London: Routledge, forthcoming). 
84 van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 2, 19; Sullivan and Reynolds, ‘Law and bioethics’, 611. 
85 Not only in the formal sector, but also in the unofficial, academic sector (for example, 
students should show due regard – if not unquestioning respect – for standard texts).  
86 E.g. between Harris and Finnis in J. Keown, ed., Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical 
and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
87 van der Burg, ‘Law and ethics’, 3, 25. A discipline might require some technical tools, 
although it is notable that in each there have been calls to purge unnecessary jargon: 
e.g. P. Butt, ‘Legalese versus plain language’, Amicus Curiae, 35 (2001), 28-32; 
Callahan, ‘Bioethics as a discipline’, 70; C. Cowley, ‘The dangers of medical ethics’, 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 31 (2005), 739-742. 
88 E.g. Foster, Choosing Life. 
89 Callahan, ‘Bioethics as a discipline’, 69. 
90 E.g. the English rulings culminating in R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 
FLR 268.  
91 C.E. Schneider, ‘Bioethics in the language of the law’, Hastings Center Report, 24(4) 
(1994), 16-22, 22. 
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hints here that bioethics might also be doing and saying more than this; if so, then there 
may be limits to “the extent to which the language of the law may safely be imported into 
bioethical discourse and to which bioethical ideas may be effectively translated into 
law”.92 
Secondly, and related to law’s prose and purpose, law is adversarial, particularly where 
judicial proceedings are concerned. Like legal cases, bioethical dilemmas “revolve 
around a nexus of competing or conflicting claims”.93 Law seeks a winner: “so much of 
what is taught in law school is about winning: winning the case, winning the arguments, 
or winning the point”.94 Yet, bioethics’ problems “are not black and white, but are often 
composed of multiple shades of grey”,95 in which there might be two competing rights, as 
opposed to a right and a wrong.96  
Certainly, law’s decisions are not always monochromatic: it sometimes manages to split 
the difference between disputing parties or principles.97 Yet, law still decides – it acts – 
and this points to a third area of divergence. Law is, as Fuller suggested, action-
orientated: law might therefore seek to kill the conflict,98 while philosophical bioethics 
could opt for over-kill, further complicating matters.99 Schneider hinted that bioethics 
encompasses more than the rules and action that fixate law; when we pan out, we can 
indeed see more of bioethics’ diverse landscape, on which the emotions, character, and 
the virtues also feature. Whether law can adequately talk to or about such matters is, of 
course, an enduring question.100  
Law’s adequacy is further questioned when we consider its aspirations. You will recall 
that Bronislawa disliked Lei-Kung’s contrivances, while Lei-Kung felt that Bronislawa, the 
dreamer, got in his way. Law’s rules perform many functions, amongst them setting 
standards and drawing lines between the permissible and impermissible. The fourth 
problem for bioethics is that law might draw the line in the wrong place, since it insists on 
only minimal standards, regarding what must be done, while (bio)ethics aspires to what 
                                                          
92 Ibid; see also Freeman, ‘Law and bioethics’, 6; Sperling, ‘Law and bioethics’, 65; 
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99 Callahan, ‘Bioethics as a discipline’, 67. 
100 E.g. M. Slote, ‘Law in virtue ethics’, Law and Philosophy, 14(1) (1995), 91-113; L.B. 
Solum, ‘Virtue jurisprudence: A virtue-centered theory of judging’, Metaphilosophy, 
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should be done.101 The bioethics journals contain many examples but the English courts’ 
long-standing reluctance to require (fully) “informed” consent suffices.102 Even the 
judges appear uneasy about the moral ramifications of some of their rulings, no matter 
how apparently sound they are in law.103  
Perhaps, then, law needs a bioethical bolt-on. “Good ethics committees begin where the 
law ends”,104 suggests Annas, providing just one example of how the disciplines might 
rightly remain separate, with bioethics (literally) providing added value to the law.105 But, 
as we have seen, law does advance or adopt particular moral positions. So what sort of 
(bio)ethics should we expect to see in law? Bioethics’ broadly composed congregation 
subjects law to a cacophony of critique: consider, for example, the diverse bioethical 
positions taken on laws governing assisted dying, embryo research and organ 
transplantation. Law will, inevitably, talk past some of these complainants.106 So, 
recalling a famous exchange between Hart and Devlin,107 should law express a positive 
morality, which commands popular support, or should it reflect a more critical morality, 
such as we might associate with bioethics?108 We saw earlier how law seems to borrow 
from each sphere, occasionally citing public opinion, elsewhere referring to the different 
sectors of bioethics.109 Unfortunately, such selections are just that: selective and 
inconsistent, with law seemingly lacking any robust or transparent methodology for 
making its moral choices.  
Maybe a messy morass of morals is appropriate, if law is only concerned with setting the 
minimal standards for communal living (which, as we saw, it might achieve by capturing a 
compromise between values, plural).110 But not every bioethicist will agree, perhaps 
understandably so, once we appreciate that law and bioethics can have very different 
audiences. Law seems often to be targeted at the transgressor, not the utopian. These 
transgressors will reside in a given jurisdiction, under the dominion of particular laws. 
The jurisdiction may be wide,111 but an essential point is that law is thereby relative to a 
particular place and, indeed, time. Time can even be a problem for law: it might 
sometimes get there first, but law will often lag behind developments in science and 
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even in morals.112 Bioethics can be relativistic, and even myopic,113 but it will also, on 
occasion, aspire to universality; law, meanwhile, remains tethered to a territory, issuing 
its edicts to its subjects, under the watchful, questioning and sometimes 
uncomprehending gaze of bioethics.  
 
5. (Happy) Endings? 
 
In conclusion, I have suggested that there are numerous contributions that law can 
make, and has made, to bioethics, which I have described as five P’s, which encompass 
law’s purpose, processes, products, practices and phrasing. There is, therefore, much that 
law has to offer bioethics, particularly insofar as law is inherently empirically-oriented and 
therefore offers a real world testing ground for particular types of solutions to particular 
moral problems. Like Bronislawa and Lei-Kung, law and bioethics do manage to 
communicate with one another more than some might believe.114 This is unsurprising 
given their close co-existence. Indeed, just as it can be difficult to define law in a way that 
does not beg moral questions, so too it can be hard to define bioethics without some 
reference to law. If the differences between law and bioethics are only gradual and 
contextual, as Van der Burg indicates, then there may be much that each can learn from 
the other.115  
Equally, however, I have argued that the relationship is marred by five A’s, which concern 
law’s articulation, angst, action-orientation, (lack of) aspiration and audience. Some of the 
problems between these flatmates might be attributed to a lack of understanding of 
what each is and does: bioethics might over-emphasise law’s authoritarian or 
argumentative sides, while law might fail to see that bioethics involves both consensus 
and controversy.116 Different authors offer different prescriptions for the various ills that 
afflict the couple, ranging from separation to the acquisition of new roles.117 For my part, 
I suspect that better appreciation of what each brings to their shared areas of interest 
provides a good place to start. Neither, it seems, can entirely replace the other;118 like 
our flatmates, each can benefit the other and, indeed, the wider communities they 
inhabit and serve, not least by spotting something that the other might miss. Whether or 
not bioethics itself is “a full discipline”, the opportunity remains – in Callahan’s words – 
for “creativity and constant re-definition”.119 We should, therefore, continue to configure 
the relationship between law and bioethics, moving it on from its “haphazard” 
beginnings.120 Sometimes friends, sometime foes, they may yet become spouses.  
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